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A DECISION-THEORETIC APPROACH TO ARMS COMPETITION 
INTRODUCTION 
Mathew D. Mccubbins 
California Institute of Technology 
Politicians and scholars alike have expressed concern over 
the omnipresent lethal stockpiling of weapons by the two superpowers. 
Few, however, have come to realize that arms growth and arms control 
are inexorably and fundamentally linked, and that the solutions to 
arms control lie within the causes of arms growth. As such, this paper 
focuses upon arms growth. It departs in two respects from the previous 
literature. First, rather than being simply descriptive, the study 
is based upon a decision-theoretic model which makes explicit the 
relation of arms growth to the achievement of mutually incompatible 
policy goals rather than as "countervalue" competitions in particular 
1 weapons systems. 
Much research concerning arms races has centered upon the 
pioneering work of Lewis F. Richardson (1960).2 The Richardson 
formulation is well known and will not be discussed in detail herein. 
The model formulated by Richardson is an excellent descriptive model 
outlining much of our intuition into the causes and development of 
arms competitions. The well known differential equations model 
dx/dt = ky + ax+ g 
dy/dt lx +by+ h (1) 
1, k > 0 
a, b < 0 
2 
arms races as a competition between two mutually dtsti-ustful 
. I budget appropriations or military uildu!Ps 
nation are answered in-kind by the competing nation(s ese 
increases continue indefinitely, abated only by lths wealth 
the competing nations, or by war. 
The most plausible operationalization of the Richa dson 
the difference equation format, describes nations X' an� 
of weapons (or military budgets) at time t (Xt l arld 
as a function of their own previous stock o weanons 
 respectively) as well as a function of their dver 
of weapons (Yt-l and Xt_1); 
Xt 
Yt 
a.Xt-1 + SYt-1 + c 
oXt-1 + yYt-1 + f 
a. a > o 
et, y < o. 
ary's 
(2) 
But in estimating this simple Richardson interactf n io�el, 
clear what X and Y should stand for in the arms r ce corltext. 
thought them to be measures of the "total armed Ill! ght" lof 
mutually di•ttustful �untti••• and latet tt•ted th1 �1, 
defense budgets as proxies for X and Y. Most subseqtnt l a 
employed defense budgets in this context; Chatterj e (19 
µ...amoe.Lei:: (1976), Ruloff (1975), Taagepera et al (1975), and I aghe - .  
witl:l 
alyJ 
4)' 
reat 
 (1959), Bouldin� (196�), 
The model has further been applied to modern ents 
and Intriligator (1977), Intriligator and Brito (1976)1, 
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Luterbacher (1976), Kent (1963), McGuire (1965, 1977), Pitman (1969), 
Saaty (1968), and Taagepera (1976), (though many of these later studies 
applied the Richardson model to stocks of weapons rather than to 
defense budgets). 
The interpretation of defense budgets as a nation's "total 
armed might" is not entirely unreasonable, as increases in military 
budgets necessarily precede increases in "total armed might.11 However, 
as evidenced in many of the above listed studies, as well as by the 
low correlation between Soviet and American defense budgets (r = .335) 
in Figure l� such a proxy gives no indication of the putative arms 
competition between the two superpowers. 
[Figure 1 here] 
As indicated earlier, other scholars have pursued the 
Richardson process through an examination of the stocks of weapons 
possessed by both sides of a competing pair of nations. Such an analysis, 
it was thought, might capture the subtle year-to-year changes in 
armaments which we expect to observe. However, such approaches were 
often merely a misapplication of disaggregated data -- a misapplication 
brought about by the poor conceptualization inherent·in the Richardson 
model. Such armament studies have frequently centered upon countervalue 
competitions as exemplified in Figure 2. Figure 2 depicts Soviet and 
American stocks of manned strategic bombers, and captures the perceived 
decrease in American and Soviet bomber strength. However, as is true 
of many of the earlier mentioned disaggregative studies it exemplifies, 
no arms competition is evidenced in Figure 2. 
[Figure 2 here] 
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Stated most boldly, the conceptualization problej inhetent 
in the Riebard•on fornrulation derive• f�• the fact that tie ilcJ>ard• 
model does not explicitly take into account the policy characJerlsti 
of weapon• 'Y't""'. E�ry weapon• oy•tem, whether it he a ""�"" Cor 
infantry battalion or a MX missile squadron, has a policy ssion for 
which it was designed and produced to fulfill. To be sure sjch 
missions is central to understanding and defining arms com etj[ti ns • 
The Richardson formulation by not explicitly considering t esJ p licYr 
characteristics of weapons systems is unable to discrimina e Jetween 
which groups of weapons we should (and should not) expect o dbserve 
competition. 
his 
esse 
I 
The failure to identify Richardson arms races in the 
aforementioned studies or in Figures 1 and 2 is owed in part io 
conceptual shortcoming. The approach to which this paper ls add 
and to which we now turn, the decision-theoretic approach, does 
incorporate the policy charact�i•tic• of �apo� into the re,ulfing 
theory of arms competition. As such the model developed dtfi,esl not 
only the shape of the expected arms races, but further pre icts 
what types of weapons systems we should (and should not) o se�e 
competition. 
etwe 
A DECISION-THEORETIC APPROACH TO ARMS COMPETITION 
The "total armed might" of a nation is a direct 
of that nation's foreign policy objectives and its overall 
doctrine. These foreign policy objectives dictate the siz 
xtinsr[o� 
stfat gic 1. 
and 
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shape of the military force a nation will develop. 
A nation's strategic doctine indentifies the types of 
responses, missions, and/or tasks its military force must be designed 
to fulfill. Each weapons system procured then fulfills a specific 
policy mission as necessitated by the needs related to the nation's 
strategic doctrine. 
For example, an American foreign policy objective is the 
prevention of nuclear conflict. A strategic doctrine developed 
relative to this objective is mutual deterrence. Specific weapons 
developed to fulfill policy missions under this doctrine are land-based 
ICBM's, manned strategic bombers, and sea-based SLBM's each of which 
has as a policy mission that . of inflicting (or threatening to inflict) 
a nuclear strike on point-targets. 
Nations derive political gain4 from the use, or potential 
use, of their "total armed might, 11 in accordance with their strategic 
doctrine. The decision-theoretic approach holds that militar� force­
level decision makers will attempt to maximize this political gain 
through their choice of weapons, subject to their nation's doctrinal, 
production, budgetary, and technological constraints. 
The basic behavioral postulate to be put forth here about 
military decision making is that military decision makers select 
weapons systems and procure armaments in such a manner as to maximize 
their capability to pursue their nation's foreign policy goals. Given 
this behavioral assertion, we wish to define a set of refutable 
hypotheses relating arms race behavior and arms control to the decision 
calculus just mentioned. 
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More for mally, the behavioral assertion we shall invrs 
onsrr 
.tion 
igate 
is that a military decision maker engages in some sort of ined 
maximizing behavior, the objective of which (for the two n 
case A and B) is to maximize 
A rr (q1····•qn,x1,x2,w1·····wn) 
where q1, • • •  ,qn represent weapons allocations for country 1' �iven 
a •et of •pecific foreign policy goal•; ":L• and x2 r'l're•e t �,..t, 
to the production of the above weapons systems, w1, • • •  ,wn iep,esent 
the weapons allocations chosen by an adversary country B, given its 
own set of foreign policy goals, and nAC-) represents the Jec�si�n 
I �is 
maximization is subject to the production and technology c6nsJra 
maker's political gain or profit from deploying q1,. • •  ,qn. 
nts 
inherent in nation A's economy which we will summarize as 
production constraint F (q1•···•qn,xl,x2) = 0 
. J 
Thus we postulate each nation maximizes its own i'ol�tical 
(3 
cl I
gain, Il (-), by selecting in an optimal fashion the deployment l1evels 
for each weapons system in its choice set, q1, • • •  ,qn' and �helemploym 
levels of productive inputs to armament manufacture, x1 an x2. 
I The decision-theoretic approach outlined herein oes rlot 
�del i• con•i•tent with, or at lea•t �t incnn•i•t�t wi9 
�r:Qped rational actor, bureaucratic or organizational frameworks 
by Allison (1971). To be sure, the decision calculus is mostl r�adily, 
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appreciated as a two-person (nation) model and as such fulfills a 
rational actor framework of government. However, the interactions of 
various bureaucracies, or the consequences of standard-operating-
procedures can result in actions which altogether appear as if the 
bureaucracy or organization was acting to maximize political gain as 
asserted. 
We will assume that equation 3 can be strictly 
linearized, in that the total overall foreign policy profit for a 
A military program Il (-) can be represented by a linear sum of the 
political gains derived from the capabilities of the individual 
weapons systems to perform their specific policy tasks. Thus we will 
assert that decision makers act to 
maximize A n (ql, .  ···�·x1, x2, w1' • • •  , wn) 
(5) 
lj � (ql, ... , qn, xl, x2, wl, ... , wn) 
subject to F (ql, • • •  , qn,xl, x2) = 0 
where � represents the individual foreign policy profits for the jth 
weapons system. 
This maximization is performed with respect to q and x, 
the armament levels deployed and the production inputs employed, given 
their expectations with regards to their opponent's reactions. 
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Further, assuming continuity for the political gain 
funuciun, IT, ruul Cho pruduuci� f�uciun, F, ruul giv� ch, futljwing 
set of assumptions an equilibrium level of arms exists foi each 
weapons sytem, and thus the decision-theoretic model is also la 
game-theoretic formulation. Before we derive the theoremJ rJ1ajing I 
this decision structure to observable artifacts of arms rlcesl w nee
to make explicit the several interactive and behavioral atumptions 
arising from the arms race context. First, the political prJfi 
function is an increasing function of quantity of one 's o almaunen 
and a decreasing function of production inputs, formally 
an�/aqj > o
A Clflk/Clxi < O 
for all k, j 
for all k, i 
(6) 
Thus, increasing the level of armaments deployed, all els� cohs�ant , 
leads to an increase in foreign policy profit, and simila:ljly Ital a I 
decrease in inputs employed. Second,the usual production 
that production is an increasing function of productive i' :::r.c�l 
the marginal productivities of both inputs are positive, 
ClF/Clxi > 0 for all i 1, 2 (7) 
Further, in line with standard economic theory we will as tlhat t 
9 
· production constraint is a decreasing function of the quantity of armaments 
produced, all else constant, 
aF/aq. < 0 J for all j. 
(8) 
Along the lines of the discussion in the second section of 
the text, we will assume that a change in nation B's jth weapons 
system (say tanks) will not have an effect on country A's allocative 
decision or political profits for its i
th ·weapons system (for ifj) 
(e.g., aircraft carriers). 
aJt;aw. k J 0 for all k f j (9) 
This assumption follows from the observation that armament decisions 
are :interrelated·between·the two adversary nations if and only if the 
policy goals of the two nations (and in particular the policy tasks 
to be performed by the weapons systems in question) are mutually 
exclusive. The specific form of (9) follows from the fact that we can 
arrange the vectors of armaments for each nation, q1, • • •  ,� and 
th w1, • • •  ,wm in a particular order such that the i weapon system in each 
arsenal is the counterforce option of each of the respective nations, 
i.e., we can arrange (order) the weapons systems in such a fashion as to 
put weapons systems for one nation against the corresponding weapons 
system for the other nation which has a mutually exclusive policy goal. 
We will further specify the following conjectural variation, 
that is,the interactive assumptions that we postulate the decision 
1 
adheres to, 
awk/axj 0 for all k, j 
10) 
awk/aqj f 0 for all k, j. 
variations specify that a change in the levell o 
inputs employed by country A for the production 
no effect on the level of armaments procured by 
the decision makers believe that an increase in 
f ils 
count 
thelr own 
will not go unnoticed by their adversary (i nly 
policy tasks of the weapons systems are mutually exc 
an� 
I usi:ve 
Assume also that the political profits function 
canvex with respect to the quantity of armaments procure 
insures unique maximum points) and concave with respedt 
production inputs employed, 
a 21\/aqj . < o for all k,j 
(ll) 
a2IIk/ax� > o for all k,i 
with assumption (6) this gives a generalized shape lfo
J 
tbe 
DO.Ll.t:l.Ca.L profit function Which insures unique, nontrivial rXIID' 
These two assumptions together, (6) and (11� specify that the 
gain accrued from the allocation of a specific welpojs $yste 
��t�t) io inoroaa'ng at a dooroaoing rato, i.• 1 · tlo f gain 
greater 
profit• from tho firot allooati= of tho �apooo •Y•1�1is 
than the gain obtained from later stockpiling of sulh wea ons l terns. 
ll 
Similarly, the assumptions relate that the marginal political 
productivity of each productive input is negative (ceteris paribus) and 
decreasing, i.e. that the loss in political profits from hiring an extra 
unit of productive input (ceteris paribus) increases as more inputs are 
hired. 
Three further assumptions are necessary to derive unique 
maximization points for ( 5 )  an d  to proceed with the development of 
meaningful (and testable) hypotheses about arms race behavior. First 
is the standard assumption that the second order sufficiency conditions 
for a constrained maximization are fulfilled. This I will give without 
justification in the following form: that the determinant of the bordered 
Hessian matrix of second prder determinants (to be discussed in (16) 
is positive. Second are the usual assumptions as to the shape of the 
production function, again without justification, 
a2F/axiaqj = a
2F/aqjaxi = 0
a2F/axiaxj =. f�8 i=j i�j 
for all i, j 
(12) 
Third, we will assume that the political profits function given in (5) 
is a general linear function of production inputs and armament outputs. 
This assumption as well takes the form of specific constraints upon the 
second order partial derivatives, in this case, 
a2n�/aqjaxi = a2rr�/axiaqj 0 
(J2TTA /ax. ax.-K. i J 0 for all k, i�j 
for all k,i, j 
(13) 
general linear form specifies only that productive inpu 
do not interact in any multiplicative fashion in th 
function: that the effects of each on political gai 
consequence of this behavior is that the first 
of the following lagrangian equal zero: 
L Ijnj + AF 
is the Lagrange multiplier. Hence,given our intera 
a�/awj = 0 as well as our conjectural variation 
summarize the model thus far as 
Ilj (qj , x1 , x2, w1, • . •  , wn) j 1, .. .,n
xi (xi' • • •  ,xij '• . • , xin) i 1, 2 
to F{j) fj (x1, x2) - qj 0 j 1,. . . , 
arrj/aqj + anj/ax1 • ax1/aqj + anj/ax2 • ax2/aqj 
arrj /awj awj/Clq. + AllF (j)/aq. = L. = 0J J J 
2 
s ardlarmaiill!'Ilt 
po!Litlical 
.,l 1eparat11 .te. 
rdJr artill 
tion 
awJa,.j 
(14� 
0 
(15) . 
arr/aqj • Clq/Clxi + I�an/a� • Clx/axi + AaF (j)/a ••. 
= L = 0 xi 
F (j) LA 0 '
13 
since from our additivity assumptions the maximization of the sum of 
political profits is equal to the sum of the maximization of individual 
profits from each weapons system, and thus maximization of Il�(-). for all J 
A 
j simultaneously is equivalent to the maximization of rr (-). The 
expressions on the right hand side of (15). represent iust a notational 
convenience for the expressions of the derivatives on the left hand side. 
Further, for expository ease, in the equations which follow, 
denote 
Lj xi 
2 . 2 2 . 2 = a  L/aq. axi,L . .  = a  L/aqi,LJ = a
 L/aq.awk J JJ wk J 
Fj = aF/aqj, and Fxi = aF/axi. 
(15) 
Equation (15) ' represents the necessary conditions for a 
constrained maximum of political gain (from weapons procurements), 
sufficient conditions for such a maximum have previously been outlined, 
that the determinant of the matrix of second order partial derivatives 
be positive. 
H = I Ljj L. L. F. I JXl JXz J 
L L L Fxl I xlj xlxl xlx2 > 0 (16) 
L L L Fx2 I x2j xlx2 x2x2 
F. F F 0 J xl Xz 
These conditions will be assumed to be fulfilled. 
I 
I 
Partially differentiating the first-order 
derive the second order partials 
Ljj = rrjj + A*Fjj = rrjj < 0 
<0 L = Il + A*F = { xix. x.x. xix. >O J l. J J 
i=j 
i;&j 
L. = rr. A*F = L = rr + A*F = 0 JXi JXi + jxi xij xij . xij 
LAj = Fj = 0 
L. � rr + �*F = rr . 
jwk jwk jwk JWk 
L = 0 xiwj 
< 0 if j = k 
= O  if j f k 
14 
(17) 
Note, the sign of Ljwk 
(< 0) follows directly from the as�ump�iqn 
that a2rr/aqjawk < o, if j = k. 
In matrix notation the above system of equation� 
L. F. aq/awj -Ljwl· • • L. I · • .-�1111m L jxl JX2 J .JWfi 
L L F ax/awj 0 . . . 0 • • •  0 xlxl xlx2 xl 
= 
L L F ax2/awj 0 
. . . 0 • • •  0 
xlx2 x2x2 Xz 
F F 0 avaw. n . . . 0 • • •  0 xl X2 J 
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The above sets of equations represent merely the steps 
necessary to define a unique, non-trivial maximum of political profits 
and to establish the set of refutable hypotheses about to be discussed. 
A unique maximum of political profits has been assured by the assumptions 
as to the shapes of the production-technology constraint and political 
profits function given in the previous section . Similarly the testa
ble 
hypotheses about arms competition follow directly from the maximization 
procedure outlined here and from the assumptions given previously. 
Given the matrix notation for the system of second-order 
Clq 
partials vi: can solve for �' the rate of change of country A's armament � 
levels corresponding to a change in the adversary nation B's armament 
level as a function of the rates of change of the production and political 
profits function. 
Clq 
Solving for ;::i by C.ramer's rule, ow . � 
Clqj/ClwR = I -Ljwk Ljxl Ljx2 Fj 
0 L L F xlxl xlx2 xl 
0 L L F XlX2 X2X2 X2 
0 F F 0 xl x2 
H 
I . (19) 
where 
-L. H11 JW� 
H 
H = I L 11 x1x1 
L xlx2 
F xl 
L F xlx2 xl 
L F x2x2 x2 
F 0 X2 
the aforementioned bordered Hessian 
matrix. 
The partial derivative has a predictable sign. 
0 by the second order conditions, and since L. ]Wk
()q /aw = -L H /H { > 0 if j = k j k jwk 11 = o if j -F k (RH2)
A multi-party extension of the result derived 
developed employing similar assumptions 
results. The basic behavior postulate for the 
calculus would be that military decision 
1 1 K K 
II (ql' • • • ,qn,xl ,x2,wl, • • • ,wn' • • • ,wl' · '  • ,
wn) 
� 1 K ljlij (ql, • • •  ,qn,xl,x2,
wl, • • •  ,wn) 
1 
(tZO). 
ave 
21) 
(22) 
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subject to F (g,x) = 0, where q, x, F, and IT are as before and w�J 
-represents th4 jth weapons system for the ith country. The comparative 
statics results would be as follows: 
Clq/aw;
> 0 if the foreign policy goals of nation 
A and i are conflicting and j = k 
0 j f. K, ';Ji (23) 
< 0 If the foreign policy goals of nation 
A and i are compatible and j = K.
Thus we postulate that military decision maker chooses the 
level of weapons deployments, qi, given their expectations for the 
level of weapons deployments for their adversaries, and the level 
of complimentary weapons deployments for their allies. Equation 
23 relates that the military decision makers 1) increase the level 
weapon(s), q:I., in reaction to an increase in the level of weapon (s) 
w� by their competitor; 2) disregard, in the allocation of q., changes J J 
i in the level of wk (j f. k) for either allies or adversaries and; 
3) apply some portion of their allies weapons stock w� which fulfill J 
the same policy tasks as q. to their political profit maximization. J 
Thus, alliances enable nations with compatible foreign 
policy objectives to take advantages of differential technologies across 
nations. For example, if the Americans are more capable of producing 
aircraft, while the British are better tank builders, then the Americans 
will specialize in aircraft (and built some tanks), while the British 
will deploy mostly tanks, and both will count some of the others weapons 
stocks as fulfilling their needs in relation to their foreign policy objectives. 
1 
Equations 21 and 23 represent the arms race hypotr· esis 
as derived from the decision-theoretic model. Equation 23 t anll�tes 
into our first refutable hypothesis (RHl),
RJ-11 Al!m-0 Jta.C.e.6 develop only between. nat.i.oM w.lt 
c.on.6.U.c.:ti.ng 6011.e,i.gh po.U.c.y goai.6. 
Whereas, equation 21 translates into our second refutable h 
(RH2), 
RH2 Al!m-0 c.ompe:ti.:tloM develop only between. weapoJl'l.6 
-0y-0:t.erru, w.lth c.on.6.U.c.:ti.ng po.U.c.y mll>-0.loM {.l.1e., 
only between. c.ou.n:t.e1L6011.c.e weapoM gll.ou.p-0) • 
DISCUSSION.- . 
The theory of arms competition just outlined is unique lin 
tha< <he �"'' of <he arma compe<i<i� are "'Plici<ly deci ionf 
theoretic. The policy goals of the arming nations and the polic 
of the specific armaments are explicitly imbedded in the d cislo 
aspe I . I framework. As such, the decision analysis explicitly defi,es lh type of arms competition, i.e., competition between counte forre 
groups, which we expect to observe. Arms competition, as hown �y 
I (3) through (23),arises from decentralized (nationalistic) decis 
making by decision-makers acting to maximize political (fo ei� 
I In contrast the Richardson model (and its hybrid�):
h
t: policy) gain subject to constraint. 
divorcing the policy aspects of weapons from their armamen 
on-
cter:l!. 
s 
ics, 
19 
is unable to define a priori where we should expect to observe arms 
competition. Further, arms competition in the Richardson framework 
arises as by a "law of nature," in a mechanistic fashion, divorcing 
decisions made by policy makers from armament levels. 
The two hypotheses, RHl and RH2, make explicit what 
Richardson did not, and conceptualize arms competitions in an 
estimatable fashion. These propositions further allow us to comment 
on the tenor of the current national armament debate, in that most 
academics and politicians who deplore the arms race speak in 
countervalue terms, and accuse administrations and military decision 
makers of a maniacal desire to destroy the world many times over. The 
decision-theoretic model and the resulting propositions suggest 
that this situation of immense countervalue redundancy emerges 
epiphenomenally from a rational counterforce decision calculus 
which is quite cost-conscious. 
Figures 3 - 5 represent a brief analysis of the second 
refutable hypothesis derived above.5 The figures represent time-
series of counterforce weapons inventories for the U.S. and Soviet 
Union. The high (and positive) correlations between the counter­
force groups depicted give preliminary evidence to the existence of 
counterforce arms competitions. 
[Figures 3, 4, 5 here] 
The model develops two refutable hypotheses in an estimatable fashion. 
Bilateral and multilateral tests of RHl and RH2 can be derived 
employing time-series force-level data as depicted in Figures 3 - 5. 
Further, insights into current arms control agreements, their strengths 
and limitations, can be derived from the decision-theoretic analysis. 
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FOOTNOTES 
* The author wishes to thank Bob Forsythe, Ed Green and 
Louie Wilde for many helpful comments. 
1. Counterforce in this context refers to pairs of weapons systems 
with conflicting policy missions (e.g., bombers and interceptors), 
while countervalue in this context refers to pairs of weapons 
systems with similar policy missions (e.g., bombers and bombers). 
Further, arms competitions through-out this analysis refer to 
disaggregated individual competitions as opposed to the inter-
pretation prevailing in the literature that arms races are 
aggregate overall phenomena. 
2. The basic Richardson model was explained and given wide circulation 
by Rapoport (1957, 1960). Stability conditions were discussed 
by Chase (1969), a multi-nation version based on Richardson 
has been developed by O'Neil (1970). An armament game devised 
by Friberg and Jonsson (1968) was observed to lead to mutual 
arms escalation. Caspary (1967) critiqued the Richardson framework 
and proposed a rather complex alternative. The relation between 
arms race and war initiation has been investigated by 
Intriligator (1964). 
3. The budget estimates in Figure 1 are S.I.P.R.I. estimates, and 
are employed as many of the arms race studies listed employed 
S.I.P.R.I. budget estimates in their analysis. The f 
serves to demonstrate the problem implicit when emplo 
budgets as a proxy for armed might, as budget estimat 
military expenditure tend to differ dramatically fro 
source to another, especially estimates for nonmarket 
as the Soviet economy. 
gure 
 ing 
s fo 
 one 
I econ 
4. The political gain (or profit) a nation derives from lthe 
deployment of a specific weapons system can consist f a 
combination of foreign policy and domestic political 
No assumption is made concerning the content of poli 
gain, as it is employed merely to represent the retu 
nation receives from weapons deployment. 
gain. 
icail 
s l 
5. The data for figures 2 - 5 is from Collins (1978) and the 
Military Balance (1964-1978). In figure 3, Soviet almoJre 
vehicles include medium and heavy tanks plus armourel 
I fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers. Figure 
4 and 5 depict the number of strategic (nuclear) bomierJ 
interceptors· (as opposed to tactical bombers and intlrclpt 
as specified by the Department of Defense. 
26 
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